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Abstract 
While many central governments amalgamate municipalities, mergers of larger county admin-
istrations are rare and hardly explored. In this paper, we assess both fiscal and political effects 
of county mergers in two different institutional settings: counties act autonomously as upper-
level local governments (Germany), or counties being decentralised branches of the state gov-
ernment (Austria). We apply difference-in-differences estimations to county merger reforms in 
each country. In both cases, some counties were amalgamated while others remain untouched. 
Austrian counties (Bezirke) and German counties (Landkreise) widely differ in terms of auton-
omy and institutions, but our results are strikingly similar. In both cases, we neither find evi-
dence for cost savings nor for staff reductions. Instead, voter turnout consistently decreases in 
merged counties, and right-wing populists seem to gain additional support. We conclude that 
political costs clearly outweigh fiscal null benefits of county merger reforms – independent of 
the underlying institutional setting. 
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1. Introduction 
“Is bigger better?”1 While evidence on the effects of municipal mergers becomes more and 
more settled, studies on mergers of larger county administrations are fairly rare. In this paper, 
we assess both fiscal and political effects of county mergers in two different institutional set-
tings. Many countries run multi-tier systems of local government. For example, counties serve 
as the upper-local level of local government below the state level in the US and in Ireland, 
Landkreise in Germany, or Bezirke in Austria. In this paper, we define counties as local juris-
dictions with some degree of self-autonomy around the average population of US counties 
(100,000) representing the second local government tier in countries with at least two subna-
tional tiers. County-sized administrations provide public services and goods, which are more 
than local in nature but cover less than a federal state or country – education and social care are 
prominent examples. Institutions and responsibilities of counties, however, differ widely across 
countries.  
In past decades, some OECD countries changed the number of county-sized administrations 
through mergers and split-offs (see Table 1). We select 12 OECD countries which currently run 
county administrations. Sweden, Portugal and Norway marginally decreased the number of 
counties in the last six decades; Ireland and especially transitioning countries such as Hungary, 
Turkey or Estonia drastically increased the number of counties in the last decades. Luxembourg 
sticks to the number of counties as of 1950, the number of counties in the US also varies rela-
tively little. Among OECD countries, Germany is an exceptional outlier and merged counties a 
great deal. German state governments expect that increases in county administrations deliver 
cost reductions through scale effects or economies of scope, and merged counties to a large 
                                                 
1 Bird and Slack (2013). 
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extent.2 Between 1950 and 2013, the number of counties virtually halves. Austria, on the con-
trary, increased the numbers of counties slightly in the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s but started mer-
ger reforms at the county level in recent years.3 The number of districts changed both in coun-
tries with elected district representation (local councils and/or governors) as well as in countries 
where districts are run by appointed rather than elected governments (see Table 1). 
[Table 1 about here] 
Because county mergers are rare, the exceptional case of Germany notwithstanding, very little 
is known whether enlarging county administrations actually pays off. Studies mainly focus on 
the municipal level. Almost all quasi-experimental studies which offer a causal interpretation 
do not show that mergers reduce total expenditures (Lüchinger und Stutzer 2002, Moisio und 
Uusitaalo 2013, Allers und Geertsma 2016, Blesse und Baskaran 2016, Blom-Hansen et al. 
2016, Fritz 2016, Studerus 2016, Harjunen et al. 2017, Sandsør et al. 2017); Reingewertz (2012) 
being the sole exception.4 Voter turnout in local elections, by contrast, seems to decrease (Fritz 
and Feld 2015, Koch und Rochat 2017, Lapointe et al. 2018). Studies also focus on city-county 
mergers which are a very specific form of county mergers (Blume and Blume 2007, Tang and 
Hewings 2017). Researchers, however, do not investigate mergers of county-sized multi-pur-
pose administrations yet.5 The sole exception for studies on mergers of rural counties is Roesel 
                                                 
2 Internalization of spatial externalities (spill-over) might be another reason for merger reforms. Spill-over may 
cause an underprovision of publicly provided goods. Mergers may then lead to an increase in expenditures. Spill-
over, however, do not play a major role in the discussion of merger reforms in Germany which were always in-
tended to cut spending. 
3 Austria increased the number of districts for two main reasons. First, after Nazi Germany annexed Austria in 
1938, few districts were merged. In the 1950s, the Austrian government re-established those districts. Second, 
Austria experienced a large increase in population after WWII from around 7 million inhabitants in 1950 to around 
8.5 million today. Therefore, some districts were split – for example, in the booming West Austrian state of Vor-
arlberg (district of Dornbirn). 
4 Blesse and Roesel (2017) provide a comprehensive overview on the literature on municipal merger reforms. 
There are also studies that do not use quasi-experimental methods such as difference-in-differences estimations 
(for example, Hanes 2015). We abstract from the results of these studies because they do not offer a causal inter-
pretation. 
5 Swianiewicz and Łukomska (2017) recently study splits of Polish counties and find that smaller counties lead to 
an increase in administrative costs but not in other budgetary category in the Polish case. There are also studies on 
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(2017) who applied the synthetic control method to state-level aggregated data. The author does 
not show cost reductions. Instead, he finds that voter turnout in county council elections de-
creases and support for right-wing populists increases significantly. 
In this paper, we investigate both fiscal and political effects of county mergers in different in-
stitutional settings. We apply difference-in-differences estimations to county merger reforms in 
Austria and Germany, which are comparable in terms of language, culture, and the style of 
administration. In both countries, some counties were amalgamated while others remain un-
touched. Against the background of cultural similarities, the institutional background differs 
substantially between Austrian counties (Bezirke) and German counties (Landkreise). German 
counties act autonomously as upper-level local governments. Austrian counties, by contrast, 
are decentralised branches of the state government. Our results for the effects of county mergers 
on spending and electoral outcomes, however, are strikingly similar for both countries. Specif-
ically, our empirical analysis compares merged counties to non-merged counties within the 
same German or Austrian federal state. In both cases, we find neither evidence for cost savings 
nor for staff reductions. Our findings are in line with theoretical considerations of Holzer et al. 
(2009) who suspect no scale effects in already large local governments. Mergers, by contrast, 
seem to bear some political costs. Voter turnout consistently decreases in merged Austrian and 
German counties, and right-wing populists seem to gain additional support. We conclude that 
political costs clearly outweigh the fiscal null benefits of county merger reforms – independent 
of the institutional background. 
                                                 
mergers of special-purpose jurisdictions such as school districts (Brasington 1999, Duncombe and Yinger 2007, 
Knight and Gordon 2008). 
5 
2. Institutional background 
2.1 County mergers in Saxony-Anhalt (Germany) 2007 
Government in Germany is shared among the federal level, the 16 federal states, and around 
11,300 local governments. The structure and responsibilities of local governments differ widely 
across federal states. However, all German states run at least two layers of local government: 
Around 11,000 Gemeinden constitute the municipal level; 300 counties (Landkreise) are the 
upper-level local governments. Municipalities hold responsible for local services such as waste 
disposal, public safety and order, and culture. German counties are mainly responsible for social 
care (youth and social welfare, accommodation costs of long-term unemployed), administrative 
services such as motor vehicle registration, economic development, public transport, and parts 
of education. A directly elected county administrator (Landrat) is the head of the county ad-
ministration;6 a county council (Kreistag) is the local parliament. 
German counties autonomously decide on upper-local affairs including the allocation of ex-
penditures. Social and administrative expenditures account for around two thirds of total ex-
penditures of German counties. In 2013, German counties spent some 34 billion Euros (around 
620 Euro per capita) which is about 25% of total local government expenditures. Total local 
government expenditure was around 14% of total public expenditure (federal level: 24%, state 
level: 23%, national insurance: 37%, EU: 2%). While German municipalities tax property and 
local business and receive parts of income and value added tax revenues, while counties, how-
ever, do not hold own tax competences. Instead, counties levy contributions from the municipal 
level (Kreisumlage), receive transfers from the federal states, or borrow. Both contributions 
from municipalities and state transfers mainly depend on local tax capacity. Around 100 urban 
counties (kreisfreie Städte) exercise both county functions and municipal functions as one; we 
                                                 
6 With the exception of the state Schleswig-Holstein, county administrators are directly elected in all German 
states. 
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exclude these large cities from the analysis because these cities differ substantially in terms of 
population and institutions.  
German federal states decide on the scope of local government including merger reforms. In 
this paper we investigate a county merger reform in the East German state of Saxony-Anhalt. 
The main target of the reform was to amalgamate and concentrate county administrations in the 
new county capital in order to improve efficiency and to operate more economically. The re-
form induced comparably little conflict. Starting in 1999, the state government negotiated re-
form guidelines with counties officials including minimum and maximum sizes of newly 
formed counties. In 2004, counties agreed on the guidelines. Newly formed counties should at 
have a population between 150,000 and 300,000 by 20157 and the size of a county should not 
exceed 2,500 square kilometres. Exceptions, however, were possible. Mergers should also con-
sider regional cultural and economic linkages. Voluntary mergers were first priority. Many 
county councils proposed voluntary mergers; the state government basically followed all pro-
posals. In May 2005, the state government announced a concrete reform act to merge counties 
by summer 2007. Finally, the state parliament approved the reform in late 2005. Three urban 
counties and two rural counties remain basically unchanged, while 19 other counties were re-
structured into nine new ones.8 At least five newly created counties perfectly correspond with 
proposals for voluntary mergers; four others correspond to large extent. Average population of 
rural counties increase from around 90,000 to 170,000. Figure 1 maps the pre-reform and post-
reform geography of Saxony-Anhalt. The reform in Saxony-Anhalt implemented the first 
county mergers since the early 1990s. In 2008 and 2011, the states of Saxony and Mecklenburg-
                                                 
7 The draft of the reform act includes a full description of the merger process (see Entwurf eines Kommunal-
neugliederungsgesetzes (KngG), Drs. 4/2182). 
8 In 2004/2005, the state government also merged municipalities. We abstract from this the merger reform which 
affected municipalities of all counties. 
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West Pomerania followed. In both states, however, all counties were merged and counterfactu-
als within the states are not available. Moreover, responsibilities of counties differ across states 
and no other German state implemented county merger reforms in the last twenty years. We 
therefore limit our analysis to Saxony-Anhalt only. 
Until the present day, there was no evaluation of the county merger reform. Opinion polls from 
2017 however show that only 30% of all citizens are pleased with the reform; 45% are some-
what or strongly dissatisfied.9 Newspapers also report that costs increased after the reform.10 
However, it remains unclear whether increases can be attributed to the merger reform. We will 
address this issue in our analysis later on. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
2.2 County mergers in Styria (Austria) 2012/2013 
The institutional background of counties (Bezirke) in Austria differs to large extent from Ger-
many. Austrian county administrations are decentralised branches of the state government ra-
ther than autonomous local authorities. Therefore, there are neither councils nor elections at the 
county level in Austria. The state government appoints the leader of the county administration 
(Bezirkshauptmann) and decides on the budget and the number of employees. Responsibilities 
of Austrian counties overlap with German counties to some extent, for example, when it comes 
to social care or issuing driver’s licenses, but Austrian counties are more limited to pure admin-
istrative functions. Therefore, Austrian county administrations are by far smaller than German 
                                                 
9 Volksstimme.de, Umfrage: Kreisgebietsreform stößt auf geteiltes Echo, https://www.volksstimme.de/sachsen-
anhalt/umfrage-kreisgebietsreform-stoesst-auf-geteiltes-echo/1491928053000. In another German state, Mecklen-
burg-West Pomerania, poll data show that around 69% of all respondents opposed district mergers that were en-
acted in 2011. Also 69% of all respondents do not believe in cost savings and 72% do not believe that the local 
administration will get closer to the people. Thus, people anticipated fiscal null effects while politicians widely 
believed in cost savings. See Kommunal.de, Gebietsreformen bringen Unmut, https://kommunal.de/artikel/ge-
bietsreformen-umfragen/. 
10 Mitteldeutsche Zeitung online, Kreisreform im Jahr 2007 in Sachsen-Anhalt hat kein Geld gespart – Verwaltung 
sogar teurer, https://www.mz-web.de/sachsen-anhalt/kreisreform-2007-umstrittene-fusionen-sparen-kein-geld---
verwaltung-sogar-teurer-25014952. 
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counties (around 1.4 vs 5.4 employees per 1,000 capita in our sample). By 2013, Austrian 
county administrations spend some 75 Euro per capita and year on average. 
The number and organization of Austrian counties changed only very little in the past 60 years 
– compared to the German case. In 1950, Austria had 93 counties and increased the number to 
99 in 2011. The very first merger reform of counties in Austria after WWII came into force in 
2012/2013.11 The state government of Styria merged 8 counties into 4 new ones while 8 other 
counties remain untouched, the urban county of Graz notwithstanding (see Figure 1). As in the 
German case of Saxony-Anhalt, the state government intended to cut costs, increase efficiency 
and provide economically sustainable administration. The reform process, however, sharply 
contrast with the German case. Because Austrian counties are part of the state government and 
there are no elected representatives at the county level, the state government decided on mergers 
“top down” in April 2012. Voluntary mergers were neither intended nor possible. By January 
2013, the average county population size increase from 59,000 to 79,000. In 2016, the state 
government of Styria praised that merged counties reduced costs and administrative staff.12 The 
government, however, does not compare figures in merged counties to the counterfactual situ-
ation, which is given by non-merged counties. If unmerged counties also reduced staff, savings 
are a result of global trends rather than a result of the reform. In the next sections, we provide 
evidence that there would have been reductions even in the absence of the merger reform. 
                                                 
11 In 2015, the state government also merged municipalities. We abstract from this the merger reform which af-
fected municipalities of all counties. See Roesel (2016). 
12 See ORF.at, Bezirksfusionen bringen Millioneneinsparungen, http://steiermark.orf.at/news/stories/2816748/. 
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3. Empirical strategy 
3.1 Data 
We collect annual data on expenditures in different categories, on the number of staff, and on 
political economy outcomes (voter turnout, party vote shares) for all counties of the German 
state of Saxony-Anhalt for the period 1995 to 2016 from official publications. Data are not 
available for some years; column (5) in the descriptive statistics (Table 2) provides an overview. 
Fiscal data refer to expenditures per capita on staff, materials, rents, maintenance, interest pay-
ments and investments. We do not transfer data to constant prices because time fixed effects 
entirely cover changes in price levels and inflation rates were comparably low. We measure 
staff as the number of employees or the number full time equivalents per capita. Finally, we use 
data of 1999, 2004, 2007/2009, and 2014 county council elections, and compute voter turnout 
and vote shares for right-wing populist parties13 and independent non-partisan lists and candi-
dates. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Data for Austrian counties are scarce because counties are formally part of the state government 
and do not run their own budget. However, we collect some three-year averages of county ad-
ministration staff before and after the merger reform from publications of the Court of Auditors 
and the state government accompanying the annual budget.14 We also collect county-level data 
on state election outcomes (voter turnout and right-wing populist15 vote shares) before (2010) 
                                                 
13 These are DVU, DSU, Republikaner, DP, NPD, Offensive D, and AfD. 
14 See Landesrechnungshof Steiermark, Bezirkshauptmannschaften, LRH 10 B 3/2005–16. Amt der Steiermärki-
schen Landesregierung, Stellenplan 2017, A5 Personal. Staff in nursing homes and other social institutions in-
cluded. 
15 FPÖ, BZÖ, and Team Stronach. 
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and after the merger reform (2015). We have to use state elections because Austrian counties 
do not have a county council, and the state government appoints the head of the administration. 
3.2 Identification 
Our main empirical strategy is to compare merged counties to non-merged counties within the 
same German or Austrian federal state over time. This allows us to abstract from heterogeneity 
across federal states in terms of responsibilities of counties. For identification, we estimate sev-
eral difference-in-differences models using OLS in the following way; we run separate estima-
tions for Saxony-Anhalt and Styria: 
 log(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡-𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the observed outcome of county 𝑖𝑖 in period 𝑡𝑡 (expenditures per capita, staff per capital, 
political economy outcome) which we include in logs. 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 represent county and year fixed 
effects. County fixed effects cover unobservable heterogeneity across counties (i.e., time-invar-
iant preferences toward spending and staff). Time effects eliminate events that affect all coun-
ties within a state simultaneously. 𝛽𝛽 is the difference-in-differences estimator and our coeffi-
cient of interest; the interaction components 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡-𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 are collinear to county 
and time fixed effects and drop out. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾 is a vector of covariates. We include logged total 
population to control for growth effects. In the case of Saxony-Anhalt, we also include dummies 
for counties that switched to accrual accounting and for counties that run a decentralised public 
employment service on their own behalf (Optionskommunen). Finally, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 describes the error 
term. We use robust standard errors (Huber 1967, White 1980) without clustering of standard 
errors because the number of potential clusters is by far too low (11 and 12). Note that, cluster-
ing standard errors on the county level, however, would not change our results. 
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Because the decision to merge individual counties are hardly exogenous, the parallel or com-
mon trend assumption is crucial for our difference-in-differences identification strategy. Our 
empirical model proposes that in the absence of the merger reform, outcomes in merged coun-
ties would have evolved in a similar fashion than in non-merged counties. The difference-in-
differences estimator captures the difference between the actual development (with reform) and 
its counterfactual counterpart (no reform). For Styria, we cannot test pre-reform trends because 
we observe one pre-reform period only. For the case of Saxony-Anhalt, we can visualise pre-
reform trends at least for expenditure and staff figures where we can rely on longer and more 
frequent time series. Figure 2 show that pre-reform trends in expenditures per capita and in staff 
per capita does not differ among counties that were merged and those that were not merged in 
2007. In some expenditure categories, for example, maintenance, pre-reform levels differ. In-
terestingly, pre-reform expenditure levels were already lower in counties intended to merge. 
Despite differences in levels, trends in all variables are parallel. Therefore, we are confident to 
propose that parallel trends would have continued for all variables under investigation in the 
absence of the 2007 merger reform, and our difference-in-differences estimator captures the 
causal reform effect quite well. 
Figure 2 also offers some preliminary results when we consider the post-reform time. Graphical 
inspection does not exhibit any significant change in the parallel trends after 2007. If the reform 
would have been effective, expenditure figures of merged and unmerged counties should di-
verge. Instead, pre-reform parallel trends continue after the reform. We take this as a first piece 
of evidence that the merger reform may have not resulted in savings on the county level. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
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4. Results 
4.1 Fiscal effects 
We now test expenditure effects of county merger reforms in the difference-in-differences re-
gression setup described above. The upper panel of Table 3 shows the results for different ex-
penditure categories in the German state of Saxony-Anhalt. The results confirm our “eyeball 
econometrics” impressions from Figure 2: we do not find significant cost reductions in any 
expenditure category. By contrast, expenditures for rents increase rather than decrease in 
merged counties, which might be a result of the reorganization of county administrations: En-
larged administrations quickly need larger buildings and offices in the new county capital. It 
takes some time to construct these buildings; administrations therefore may have to rent some 
further offices at least for the time of transition. 
[Table 3 about here] 
As a robustness check, we also compute effects for individual years around the merger reform 
(see Table 4). The findings confirm our baseline results: We find significant increases in rent 
expenditures in merged counties but do not prove any cost reduction. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Returning to Table 3, we also assess the effects on staff. We do not find that mergers reduced 
staff per capita in the case of Saxony-Anhalt (columns (7) and (8)), which corroborates our null 
findings for staff expenditures. The same is true for the Austrian merger reform under investi-
gation (see lower panel of Table 3). We do not find a significant effect of county mergers on 
staff or expenditures in any other administrative function at least 6 to 9 years after the merger 
reform. For two main reasons, the parallel findings for Germany and Austria are of crucial 
importance. First, Austrian counties are by far smaller than the German ones. Null effects in 
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German counties may arise because counties were already large enough. However, we do also 
find null effects in the Austrian case rejecting this hypothesis. Second, the Austrian case allows 
us to rule out that political economy drives the results. In the German case, a local council 
decides on the annual budget. One (rather trivial) explanation why expenditures in merged 
counties may not change might be that local preferences do not change. In Austria, however, 
the state government decides on county staff and finance and may realize (potential) scale more 
easily. However, in neither case we observe a change in county staff.  
Altogether, the results confirm prior findings that mergers of local administrations do not result 
in cost savings (see Blesse and Roesel 2017). This finding may explain why only few countries 
applied merger reforms so far (Table 1). Germany is the only exception. We argue that the 
German trend toward county mergers might not be driven by best-practice experiences, but 
might be rather a result of mimicking and yardstick competition. In Germany, not the central 
government but federal states decide on local government structures. In 1969, the state of 
Rhineland-Palatinate was the first state that implemented county mergers albeit the academic 
debate was not settled at the time (Hoffmann 1973). In 1970, 1972, 1973, and 1974, all other 
West German states followed the example of Rhineland-Palatinate, however, without investi-
gating the outcomes of reforms in other states.16 Because reforms quite often target mean 
county population in all other states, Germany saw a race to the top in terms of county popula-
tion. In 2017, however, the states of Brandenburg and Thuringia stopped county mergers after 
large-scale protests that explicitly refer to the ineffectiveness of merger reforms in other states. 
                                                 
16 German state officials did not carry out or commissioned a reform evaluation for decades. Instead, officials 
argue that responsibilities of counties changed; pre- and post-reform figures were therefore not comparable (see, 
for example, Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, 10 Jahre Gebietsreform: Rosenhochzeit im Saalekreis ohne Liebe?, 
https://www.mz-web.de/merseburg/10-jahre-gebietsreform-rosenhochzeit-im-saalekreis-ohne-liebe--25137234). 
We account for changes in responsibilities because we compare merged to non-merged counties that both experi-
enced the same changes in responsibilities. 
14 
4.2 Political effects 
County mergers do not only amalgamate administrations but also, in the case of Germany, 
county councils. The number of county councillors sharply decrease and areas become un-
wieldy large. As a result, public goods may be provided less efficient because information 
asymmetries increase and preferences become more heterogeneous (Oates 1972). Observers 
therefore worry that merger reforms may induce dissatisfaction, increase distances to the ad-
ministration, and reduce political participation. Denters et al. (2014) document adverse effects 
of jurisdiction size on local democracy, especially in small municipalities. Hansen (2015) 
shows that satisfaction with the local administration and with the local democracy decreased in 
the course of Danish municipal mergers. The findings by Lassen and Serritzlew (2011a, 2011b) 
suggest that this might be result of decreases in internal political efficacy, i.e., the ability to 
perceive and to understand processes in local politics. Citizens may not accept artificially con-
structed jurisdictions and react by abstaining from elections or voting for populist parties. Roe-
sel (2016) provides some descriptive evidence for this effect. Second, voter turnout may de-
crease because election incentives decrease. Studies consistently show that voter turnout de-
crease in constituency size because the probability to be the pivotal voter decrease (for surveys 
see Cancela and Geys 2016, van Houwelingen 2017). Third, larger counties may crowd out 
non-partisan candidates that cannot rely on party organizations, which are required to keep in 
touch with local problems in unwieldy large jurisdictions (Fritz und Feld 2015). 
We investigate whether merger reforms come with adverse effects on political outcomes related 
to these three hypothesis: voter turnout, vote shares for right-wing populists, and vote shares 
for non-partisan candidates. Table 5 shows for the case of Saxony-Anhalt that voter turnout in 
county council election decrease by 4.3 percentage points in merged counties compared to un-
merged counties. This is fully in line with findings by Fritz and Feld (2015), Koch and Rochat 
(2017), and Lapointe et al. 2018 for municipal mergers in Germany, Switzerland, and Finland 
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respectively. Vote shares for right-wing populists, by contrast, increase by around 1.8 percent-
age points, which is substantial given the mean right-wing populist vote share of 2.0 percent. 
Finally, we do not find an effect on non-partisan candidate vote shares contrasting former find-
ings for the municipal level (Fritz and Feld 2015). Thus, county mergers do not affect lists of 
independent candidates. The results for Saxony-Anhalt entirely reproduce findings by Roesel 
(2017) for the neighboring state of Saxony that also merged counties: Voter turnout decrease, 
right-wing populists benefit, and vote shares for independent non-partisan candidates are not 
affected. Therefore, even against the background that most mergers in Saxony-Anhalt were 
somewhat voluntary and accepted by local councils, voters seem to protest against larger juris-
dictions. Koch and Rochat (2017) report similar effects on voter turnout for Swiss municipali-
ties where also local referenda on municipal mergers were held. Lapointe et al. 2018 elaborate 
on the Finish case. We conclude that based on our empirical findings also mergers on the county 
level may have adverse effects on local democracy. 
[Table 5 about here] 
In the Austrian state of Styria, county administrations are formally part of the state government. 
Therefore, we examine changes in political outcomes of the state elections 2010 (before mer-
gers) and 2015 (after mergers). The results fairly replicate our findings for Saxony-Anhalt re-
garding the negative effects on voter turnout. We interpret this finding as suggestive evidence 
for protest against the compulsory merger reform by the state government. However, the con-
nection between state elections and county mergers is much looser in Austria. Thus, we do not 
confirm an effect on right-wing populist vote shares. There were also no independent non-par-
tisan candidates in Austrian state elections. 
16 
5. Conclusion 
We have shown that county mergers do not pay off in terms of cost or staff reductions. Thereby, 
the institutional background does not matter: In Germany, counties act autonomously as upper-
level local governments. In Austria, by contrast, counties are decentralised administrations of 
the state government. We do neither show that mergers lead to scale effects in the German case 
nor in the Austrian case. Instead, voter turnout decrease and right-wing populists seem to gain 
additional support. Thus, political costs clearly outweigh fiscal null benefits of county merger 
reforms – independent of the institutional setting considered here. 
However, our study has limitations, which further research may address. First, we stick to fiscal 
outcomes only but do not observe efficiency. If the same amount of money is spent for even 
more valuable projects, efficiency (output-input relations) increase even when costs remain 
constant. Our null effects in expenditures may mask these kind of efficiency improvements. A 
valuable avenue would be to address this issue, for example, by investigating changes in DEA 
(data envelopment analysis) scores of local administrations before and after merger reforms. 
Second, we observe a rather low number of merged and unmerged counties. If researchers 
would like to investigate reforms where only one or few counties were merged (for example, 
Ireland, Israel, or Norway), the synthetic control method offers a reasonable framework (see 
Abadie et al. 2015). Finally, we find robust and significant effects on political economy out-
comes but can yet only hypothesise on the underlying channels. A highly valuable research 
question is why citizens abstain from voting in enlarged jurisdictions. Further research may 
address the mechanisms of adverse effects of merger reforms on local democracy in more detail. 
Moreover, future research should address related quasi-experimental effects of the implemen-
tation or abolishment of inter-municipal cooperation and hence the question, whether inter-
municipal cooperation offers a valid alternative to size consolidation of local governments (Al-
lers and van Ommeren 2016). 
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FIGURE 1. COUNTY MERGERS 
Germany (federal state of Saxony-Anhalt) 
Before mergers 
 
After mergers (2007) 
 
Austria (federal state of Styria) 
Before mergers 
 
After mergers (2012/2013) 
 
 Merged counties (treatment group)  Unmerged counties (control group)  Urban counties (excluded) 
Notes: The maps show the shift in county borders in the German state of Saxony-Anhalt (Landkreise, upper panel) 
and in the Austrian state of Styria (Bezirke, lower panel) following merger reforms in 2007 and 2012/2013. White 
and blue shaded areas represent unmerged and merged counties; urban counties are colored in grey. 
  
22 
FIGURE 2. COMMON TRENDS BEFORE MERGER REFORM (GERMANY ONLY) 
 
▬ ▬ Merged counties (treatment group) ▬▬ Unmerged counties (control group) 
Notes: The figure shows pre- and post-merger reform trends in expenditures and staff of nine merged counties in 
the German state of Saxony-Anhalt (blue dashed lines). Two unmerged counties serve as the control group (black 
solid lines). Vertical lines depict the announcement (grey dashed line) and the implementation (black solid line) 
of the merger reform in 2005 and in 2007.  
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TABLE 1. NUMBER OF COUNTY ADMINISTRATIONS IN SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES 
 Ger-many Sweden Norway 
Luxem-
bourg Austria Ireland Estonia Poland 
Hun-
gary US 
Slo-
vakia Turkey 
Elected 
coun-
cil?a 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
1950 705 24 20 12 93 25 11 308b 9c 3,111 38d 422 
2013 402 21 19 12 95 28 15 314 24 3,143 79 919 
Δ -303 -3 -1 0 +2 +3 +4 +6 +15 +32 +38 +497 
Notes: The figure compares the number of county administrations (and equivalents) in selected countries in 1950 
to 2013. Source: National statistical offices, Statoids.com, Swianiewicz and Łukomska (2017) for Poland. a) In-
formation on election of district councils from Treisman (2008). b): This number refers to 1999 as Polish counties 
(powiats) were only established in 1999. c) This number refers to the year 1990 for Hungarian districts (megyek). 
d) This number refers to the year 1990 for Slovak districts (okresné).   
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TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Panel A: Germany (Saxony-Anhalt) 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Covered  period 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Expenditures (Euro per capita)a       
Staff 220 213.951 31.344 162.564 306.530 1995–2014 
Materials 220 177.678 54.074 90.849 348.440 1995–2014 
Rents 132 7.791 3.469 1.956 21.027 2003–2014 
Maintenance 132 27.254 5.872 17.155 43.980 2003–2014 
Interest payments 132 21.168 8.648 5.341 52.230 2003–2014 
Investments 220 78.313 41.307 20.696 234.162 1995–2014 
Staff (per 1,000 capita)       
Employees 153 5.369 0.675 4.277 7.723 2003–2016 
Full time equivalents 153 4.852 0.624 3.852 7.186 2003–2016 
Political economy (county council elections)       
Voter turnout 56 43.616 6.018 32.266 59.482 1999–2014 
Vote share right-wing populists 56 2.045 2.130 0 8.424 1999–2014 
Vote share non-partisans 56 8.658 5.073 0 20.629 1999–2014 
Controls       
log Population 322 12.017 0.348 11.326 12.552 1995–2016b 
Accrual accounting 322 0.264 0.441 0 1 1995–2016 
Decentralised public employment service 322 0.211 0.409 0 1 1995–2016 
 
Panel B: Austria (Styria) 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Covered  period 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Staff (per 1,000 capita)       
Employees 24 1.402 0.282 0.988 1.951 2003, 2016c 
Political economy (state elections)       
Voter turnout 26 69.860 3.633 60.727 75.969 2010, 2015 
Vote share right-wing populists 26 21.376 8.789 10.968 35.120 2010, 2015 
Controls       
log Population 26 11.314 0.495 10.252 12.522 2003, 2016c 
Notes: The table show the descriptive statistics for the German state of Saxony-Anhalt (upper panel) and the Aus-
trian state of Styria (lower panel). a) Expenditures in Euro per capita and current prices. a) Population 2016 proxied 
with population 2015. c) 2003: average over the years 2002, 2003, 2004; 2016: average over the years 2015, 2016, 
2017. 
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TABLE 3. FISCAL EFFECTS OF MERGER REFORMS 
 
Panel A: Germany (Saxony-Anhalt) 
log Expenditures per capita log Staff 
Staff Materials Rents Maintenance Interest  payments Investments Employees 
Full time 
equivalents 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(Treat × Post-Mergers) -0.052 0.026 0.299** 0.032 -0.147 0.142 -0.069 -0.083    
 (0.059) (0.107) (0.097) (0.048) (0.156) (0.112) (0.075) (0.089)    
log Population -0.053 -0.478 -0.696 0.794 -8.647** -0.314 2.742 3.155    
 (0.539) (2.265) (3.384) (3.135) (3.203) (2.195) (3.331) (3.513)    
Period 1995–2014 1995–2014 2003–2014 2003–2014 2003–2014 1995–2014 2003–2016 2003–2016 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Counties 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Obs. 209 209 121 121 121 209 142 142    
Within R² 0.682 0.475 0.241 0.519 0.879 0.579 0.158 0.233    
 
Panel B: Austria (Styria) 
log Expenditures per capita log Staff 
Staff Materials Rents Maintenance Interest  payments Investments Employees 
Full time 
equivalents 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(Treat × Post-Mergers) – – – – – – -0.006 – 
 – – – – – – (0.108) – 
log Population – – – – – – 0.653 – 
 – – – – – – (0.847) – 
Period – – – – – – 2003, 2015 – 
Year fixed effects – – – – – – Yes – 
County fixed effects – – – – – – Yes – 
Counties – – – – – – 12 – 
Obs. – – – – – – 24 – 
Within R² – – – – – – 0.402 – 
Notes: The table shows the results of difference-in-differences estimations comparing nine merged counties to two 
unmerged counties in Saxony-Anhalt (upper panel) and four merged counties to eight unmerged counties in Styria 
(lower panel). Logged expenditures or staff per capita are the dependent variables. (Treat × Post-Mergers) denotes 
the reform effect. We exclude the reform year 2007 in the case of Saxony-Anhalt. Further controls: Dummies for 
counties with accrual accounting and with decentralised public employment service. Significance levels (Robust 
standard errors in brackets): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. 
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TABLE 4. FISCAL EFFECTS BY POST-MERGER YEAR (GERMANY ONLY) 
 
Panel A: Germany (Saxony-Anhalt) 
log Expenditures per capita log Staff 
Staff Materials Rents Maintenance Interest  payments Investments Employees 
Full time 
equivalents 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(Treat × Before 3 Years) 0.079** -0.047 0.070 0.053 0.039 -0.108 0.008 0.045 
 (0.034) (0.128) (0.104) (0.063) (0.047) (0.178) (0.039) (0.052) 
(Treat × Before 2 Years) 0.051 -0.041 0.234 -0.012 0.023 0.105 -0.023 0.016 
 (0.050) (0.131) (0.183) (0.072) (0.071) (0.869) (0.044) (0.047) 
(Treat × Before 1 Year) 0.057 0.028 0.738* 0.027 0.041 0.379 -0.012 -0.001 
 (0.077) (0.138) (0.360) (0.083) (0.135) (0.223) (0.050) (0.047) 
(Treat × After 1 Year) 0.026 0.001 0.437 0.086 0.023 0.542 -0.031 0.000 
 (0.065) (0.129) (0.344) (0.104) (0.269) (0.379) (0.061) (0.070) 
(Treat × After 2 Years) 0.014 -0.084 0.836*** 0.059 -0.093 0.458 -0.055 -0.033 
 (0.064) (0.160) (0.153) (0.115) (0.159) (0.278) (0.067) (0.067) 
(Treat × After 3 Years) -0.009 -0.029 0.666*** 0.082 -0.145 0.306 -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.063) (0.155) (0.118) (0.103) (0.166) (0.177) (0.104) (0.099) 
(Treat × After 4 Years) -0.045 0.024 0.742*** 0.051 -0.140 0.201 -0.099 -0.106 
 (0.075) (0.170) (0.131) (0.114) (0.213) (0.153) (0.094) (0.092) 
(Treat × After 5 Years) -0.068 -0.004 0.557** -0.002 -0.113 0.123 -0.126 -0.124 
 (0.066) (0.144) (0.204) (0.077) (0.261) (0.137) (0.090) (0.088) 
(Treat × After 6 Years) -0.094 0.089 0.113 0.026 -0.197 -0.231 -0.116 -0.116 
 (0.077) (0.193) (0.370) (0.082) (0.189) (0.141) (0.086) (0.087) 
(Treat × After 7 Years) -0.066 0.134 0.560*** 0.034 -0.194 -0.116 -0.103 -0.103 
 (0.072) (0.139) (0.137) (0.093) (0.272) (0.289) (0.109) (0.105) 
log Population -0.081 -0.456 -0.973 0.756 -8.712** -0.422 2.685 3.074 
 (0.531) (2.323) (3.649) (3.260) (3.304) (2.244) (3.440) (3.620) 
Period 1995–2014 1995–2014 2003–2014 2003–2014 2003–2014 1995–2014 2003–2016 2003–2016 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Counties 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Obs. 209 209 121 121 121 209 142 142 
Within R² 0.693 0.480 0.366 0.530 0.885 0.599 0.178 0.256 
Notes: The table shows the results of difference-in-differences estimations comparing nine merged counties to two 
unmerged counties in Saxony-Anhalt. Logged expenditures or staff per capita are the dependent variables. (Treat 
× After n years) denote the effects n years after the reform year 2017. Further controls: Dummies for counties with 
accrual accounting and with decentralised public employment service. We exclude the reform year 2007. Signifi-
cance levels (Robust standard errors in brackets): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. 
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TABLE 5. POLITICAL EFFECTS OF MERGER REFORMS 
 Panel A: Germany (Saxony-Anhalt) – County elections 
 
Voter turnout Vote share right-wing populists Vote share non-partisans 
(1) (2) (3) 
(Treat × Post-Mergers) -4.342** 1.727*** 0.159 
 (1.446) (0.447) (1.696) 
log Population -15.308 -28.284* -72.158** 
 (22.259) (14.550) (27.075) 
Period 1999–2014 1999–2014 1999–2014 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Counties 11 11 11 
Obs. 44 44 44 
Within R² 0.807 0.504 0.532 
 Panel B: Austria (Styria) – State elections 
 
Voter turnout Vote share right-wing populists Vote share non-partisans 
(1) (2) (3) 
(Treat × Post-Mergers) -1.134** 0.552 – 
 (0.408) (1.354) – 
log Population 1.798 2.109 – 
 (2.545) (16.790) – 
Period 2010, 2015 2010, 2015 – 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes – 
County fixed effects Yes Yes – 
Counties 12 12 – 
Obs. 24 24 – 
Within R² 0.923 0.984 – 
Notes: The table shows the results of difference-in-differences estimations comparing nine merged counties to two 
unmerged counties in Saxony-Anhalt (upper panel) and four merged counties to eight unmerged counties in Styria 
(lower panel). Voter turnout or vote shares are the dependent variables. (Treat × Post-Mergers) denotes the reform 
effect. In the case of Saxony-Anhalt, we use data of the 1999, 2004, 2007 (2009), and 2014 county council elec-
tions. In the case of Styria, we use data of the 2010 and the 2015 state elections. Significance levels (Robust 
standard errors in brackets): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. 
